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POINT PAPERA. Net Assessments in National Intelligence

1. Problem. DoD intelligence agencies (1) contend "net assessments" are beyond the purview of intelligence and (2) object on substantive grounds to one type of force interaction analysis in NIE 11-3/8 which they regard as a net assessment.

2. Net Assessments in the Estimating Process. Resolution of the problem has been hampered by lack of common understanding of the definition of net assessments and their role in the estimative process.

--All estimates of future developments are the end product of interaction analyses--also referred to by some as "net assessments."

--Estimates are predictions based on systematic evaluation of key determinants of future developments, including US policies, programs, forces and plans.

3. Net Assessments in NIEs. NIEs do not contain net assessments of US-USSR military balances. They contain interaction analyses which evaluate alternative policies, forces and conduct of foreign states using as a given US policies, forces and plans. For example, interaction analysis requiring knowledge of US policies and forces in NIE 11-3/8 include:

--Future Soviet strategic policies

--Characteristics of individual Soviet weapon system (e.g. Soviet SAMs vs US cruise missiles)

--Non-quantified analysis of the Soviet potential to perform certain missions (e.g., Soviet ASW forces vs US SSBNs)

--Computer simulations to show trends in Soviet potential to perform certain missions (e.g., potential of Soviet ICBMs to destroy US Minuteman)

4. Net Assessments not in NIEs.

--Comprehensive net assessments of the strategic balance; of the NATO-Warsaw Pact balance.

--Comprehensive net assessments of the balance of Soviet and US "national power."

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5. Objections to Net Assessments in NIE 11-3/8. Of the many interaction analyses in NIE 11-3/8, DoD agencies have objected to only one--the assessments of weapons remaining to the two sides following a first strike counterforce attack by one side on the other.

--Indicates the crux of the issue is substantive rather than one of bureaucratic turf.

6. Conclusions.

That "net assessments" in the form of analyses of the interaction of US and foreign policies, programs and forces, are beyond the purview of intelligence is patently without merit.

--To proscribe such assessment for NIEs would be contrary to the nature of the estimating process.

--Prerogatives of the DCI and CIA for conducting US and Soviet force interactions are not the same as those of departmental intelligence agencies. The DCI and the CIA should not be constrained by a particular allocation of staff functions which the Department of Defense finds suitable to its own needs.

The challenge to DCI prerogatives for conducting "net assessments" resulted from a substantive disagreement with only one of the many interaction analyses appearing in NIEs on Soviet strategic programs--none of which were net assessments of the strategic balance. On substantive grounds, the objections of the DoD intelligence agencies to the analysis of residual weapons in NIEs had some merit.

7. Recommendation. That the DCI advise the Secretary of Defense that, in his view:

--Net assessments of the overall US-Soviet or NATO-Warsaw Pact military balance, as well as suggestions, proposals or evaluations of US policies programs, weapons or plans should not appear in NIEs.

--Producers of national intelligence are not foreclosed from using any particular type of analyses.

--Interaction analyses conducted by intelligence should be to assist in evaluating alternative policies, forces and conduct of foreign nations using, as a given, US policies, forces and plans.

--Interaction analyses in NIEs on the USSR should be aimed at replicating how the Soviets evaluate the military situation.

--The substantive value of any particular interaction analyses appearing in NIEs should be judged by the DCI on a case by case basis.

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B. Intelligence Access to US Defense Planning Data. (Pertinent extract of Executive Order 12036 is attached)

1. Some Department of Defense elements are reluctant and some have refused to share with CIA intelligence analysts data on US forces and defense programs and plans. The production of national intelligence requires that analysts have knowledge of US foreign and defense policies, plans, future forces and military research and development.

--This problem is related in part to the "net assessment" issue.

--It is not universal. On many matters cooperation between CIA analysts and DoD elements is excellent.

--Some withholding of data is quite justified to protect highly sensitive US defense research, operations and plans.

2. Some examples of intelligence requirements

--Knowledge of US military capabilities figure in assessments of the likelihood of Soviet courses of action--in the Middle East for example.

--Data on current and future US weapons are needed to assess the characteristics and performance of individual foreign weapon systems--like data on the radar cross sections of US long range cruise missiles.

--Knowledge of US military research and development is necessary to understand the implications of fragmentary indications of Soviet progress in particular technologies.

--Data on future US forces is needed in projecting alternative future Soviet forces and trends in Soviet capabilities relevant to specific missions.

3. Recommendation. That Secretary Weinberger authorize and encourage elements of the Department of Defense to make available to CIA--within the limits of security--defense information required for the production of national intelligence.

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(g) The departments and agencies may appeal to the President decisions by the Director of Central Intelligence on budget or reprogramming matters of the National Foreign Intelligence Program.

(h) The Director of Central Intelligence shall monitor National Foreign Intelligence Program implementation and may conduct program and performance audits and evaluations.

1-603. *Responsibility For National Foreign Intelligence.* The Director of Central Intelligence shall have full responsibility for production and dissemination of national foreign intelligence and have authority to levy analytic tasks on departmental intelligence production organizations, in consultation with those organizations. In doing so, the Director of Central Intelligence shall ensure that diverse points of view are considered fully and that differences of judgment within the Intelligence Community are brought to the attention of national policymakers.

1-604. *Protection of Sources, Methods and Procedures.* The Director of Central Intelligence shall ensure that programs are developed which protect intelligence sources, methods and analytical procedures, provided that this responsibility shall be limited within the United States to:

(a) Using lawful means to protect against disclosure by present or former employees of the CIA or the Office of the Director of Central Intelligence, or by persons or organizations presently or formerly under contract with such entities; and

(b) Providing policy, guidance and technical assistance to departments and agencies regarding protection of intelligence information, including information that may reveal intelligence sources and methods.

1-605. *Responsibility of Executive Branch Agencies.* The heads of all Executive Branch departments and agencies shall, in accordance with law and relevant Attorney General procedures, give the Director of Central Intelligence access to all information relevant to the national intelligence needs of the United States and shall give due consideration to requests from the Director of Central Intelligence for appropriate support for CIA activities.

1-606. *Access to CIA Intelligence.* The Director of Central Intelligence, shall, in accordance with law and relevant Attorney General procedures, give the heads of the departments and agencies access to all intelligence, developed by the CIA or the staff elements of the Office of the Director of Central Intelligence, relevant to the national intelligence needs of the departments and agencies.

1-7. *Senior Officials of the Intelligence Community.* The senior officials of each of the agencies within the Intelligence Community shall:

1-701. Ensure that all activities of their agencies are carried out in accordance with applicable law;

1-702. Make use of the capabilities of other agencies within the Intelligence Community in order to achieve efficiency and mutual assistance;

1-703. Contribute in their areas of responsibility to the national foreign intelligence products;

1-704. Establish internal policies and guidelines governing employee conduct and ensure that such are made known to each employee;

1-705. Provide for strong, independent, internal means to identify, inspect, and report on unlawful or improper activity;

1-706. Report to the Attorney General evidence of possible violations of federal criminal law by an employee of their department or agency, and report to the Attorney General evidence of possible violations by any other person of those federal criminal laws specified in guidelines adopted by the Attorney General;